Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing

Lawrence M. Ausubel () and Peter Cramton
Additional contact information
Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, https://www.econ.umd.edu

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multiple item auction with interdependent values. By withholding quantity in some circumstances, the seller can improve revenues or mitigate collusion. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings where resale exhausts all the gains from trade among the bidders, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.

Keywords: Auctions; Vickrey Auctions; Multiple Item Auctions; Resale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2004, Revised 1999-06-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Economic Theory, 23, 493-505, April 2004. Reprinted in Charalambos Aliprantis, et al. (eds.), Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 355-368, 2003.

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/99wp-v ... -reserve-pricing.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99wpvic

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().