Electoral competition under imperfect information

Jean-François Laslier and Karine Straeten ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 24, issue 2, 419-446

Abstract: This paper considers electoral competition between two office-motivated parties and one voter, in the presence of two alternative policies and under imperfect information. The theory of refinements of Nash equilibrium predicts the outcome of this three-player game: both parties faithfully use their information and try to find the best policy for the voter. We discuss the meaning of this model for Politics and prove that the same result holds for any number of voters, provided that parties are expected plurality maximizers and that voters satisfy a version of the sincere voting assumption adapted to this strategic setting. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Electoral competition; Voting; Equilibrium refinement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0414-z

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