Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies

Miguel Gines-Vilar () and Francisco Marhuenda ()

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 12, issue 2, 423-432

Abstract: In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are indifferent among all the allocations in it.

Date: 1998-08-19
Note: Received: February 26, 1996; revised version: January 31, 1997
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