Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies

Miguel Ginés Vilar () and Francisco Marhuenda ()
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Miguel Ginés Vilar: Universitat Jaume I
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Miguel Gines-Vilar ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In economies with public goods, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic selections from the set of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations. Such selections exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. This requirement is very restrictive in the context oC more than one public good. However, whenever it holds any such mechanism must choose an egalitarian equivalent allocation.

Keywords: Public goods; technological monotonicity; egalitarian equivalent allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996-07
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1996-12.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1996 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1996-12

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