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The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games

Dov Monderer, Ezra Einy and Diego Moreno ()
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Dov Monderer: Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, ISRAEL
Ezra Einy: Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, E-28903 Getafe, Madrid, SPAIN

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 11, issue 3, 585-601

Abstract: We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the prekernel.

Date: 1998-05-05
Note: Received: June 6, 1996; revised version: March 1, 1997
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