The least core, kernel, and bargaining sets of large games

Ezra Einy and Dov Monderer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study the least core, the kernel, and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countable additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that this intersection is contained in the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.

Keywords: Coalitional; games; Least; Core; Kernel; Bargaining; Sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-06
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Journal Article: The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:4097

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