Sequential decisions with several agents

Marco Scarsini and Bruno Bassan
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Bruno Bassan: Dipartimento di Matematica, UniversitÁ "La Sapienza", I-00185 Roma, ITALY

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 12, issue 2, 391 pages

Abstract: We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.

Date: 1998-08-19
Note: Received: October 23, 1995; revised version: June 25, 1997
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