Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets

John Wooders

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 11, issue 1, 215-224

Abstract: We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.

JEL-codes: C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11-17
Note: Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996
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