Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations

Hervé Crès and Yves Balasko

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 12, issue 2, 313-334

Abstract: Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurence of Condorcet cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of the latters are weak: among the n! possible orderings of n alternatives, more than one half are admissible within a domain. The resulting aggregated preference has then a neglectable probability of showing up cycles. We show moreover that the set of individual preferences can be `naturally' partitioned into two such domains.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-19
Note: Received: June 17, 1996; revised version: April 15, 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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