Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles Kahn
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Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans: Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 12, issue 2, 227-258

Abstract: Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-19
Note: Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (111)

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