Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Jerry S. Kelly and Donald E. Campbell
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Jerry S. Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA
Donald E. Campbell: Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 12, issue 1, 147-162

Abstract: If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y).

JEL-codes: D61 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-06-16
Note: Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997
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