Large contests without single crossing

Wojciech Olszewski () and Ron Siegel ()
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Wojciech Olszewski: Northwestern University
Ron Siegel: The Pennsylvania State University

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 74, issue 4, No 3, 1043-1055

Abstract: Abstract We show that the equilibria of contests with many players and prizes are approximated by certain single-agent mechanisms. This complements the work of Olszewski and Siegel (Econometrica 84:835–854, 2016), who considered a more restricted environment in which players’ utility function satisfies a strict single crossing condition. Relaxing strict single crossing enlarges the set of approximating mechanisms and weakens the notion of approximation, but implications regarding equilibrium behavior in large contests can nevertheless often be derived. When the approximating mechanism is unique, a stronger notion of approximation obtains.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Asymmetric contests; Large games; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01244-1

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