Robust contracting in general contract spaces

Julio Backhoff-Veraguas (), Patrick Beissner () and Ulrich Horst ()
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Julio Backhoff-Veraguas: University of Vienna
Patrick Beissner: The Australian National University
Ulrich Horst: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 4, No 4, 917-945

Abstract: Abstract We consider a general framework of optimal mechanism design under adverse selection and ambiguity about the type distribution of agents. We prove the existence of optimal mechanisms under minimal assumptions on the contract space and prove that centralized contracting implemented via mechanisms is equivalent to delegated contracting implemented via a contract menu under these assumptions. Our abstract existence results are applied to a series of applications that include models of optimal risk sharing and of optimal portfolio delegation.

Keywords: Robust contracts; Nonmetrizable contract spaces; Ambiguity; Financial markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01354-9

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