Coalitions with limited coordination

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras ()
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Leonidas C. Koutsougeras: University of Manchester

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 2, No 5, 439-456

Abstract: Abstract We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions can form within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be defined in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the different markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.

Keywords: Core; Multiple proposals; Incomplete coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D50 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z

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