Success in contests

David K. Levine () and Andrea Mattozzi
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David K. Levine: EUI Economics

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 2, No 11, 595-624

Abstract: Abstract Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap.

Keywords: Contests; Auctions; Discontinuous games; All-pay auction; Tullock function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4

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