Shingo Ishiguro ()
Additional contact information
Shingo Ishiguro: Osaka University
Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 1, No 9, 257-300
Abstract In this study, we present a dynamic theory of management cycles under which firms endogenously switch between management regimes with different levels of profitability over time. Firms accumulate managerial capital as intangible assets such as managerial knowledge, know-how, and skills over time subject to limited contract enforcement. We show that the current managers of a firm are disciplined by not only the managerial capital accumulated through past business operations but also the market valuation of the future profitability of the firm. Through such dynamic interactions, we show that management cycles endogenously emerge and persist over time.
Keywords: Dynamic enforcement; Managerial capital; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D86 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-020-01337-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01337-2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils
More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().