A “fractal” solution to the chopstick auction

Christian Ewerhart

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 74, issue 4, No 2, 1025-1041

Abstract: Abstract This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games Econ Behav 44(1):114–133, 2003a). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has the same Hausdorff dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games.

Keywords: Chopstick auction; Exposure problem; Self-similarity; Blotto games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A "fractal" solution to the chopstick auction (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1052-1

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