Revisiting the Coase theorem

Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno-García ()
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Emma Moreno-García: Universidad de Salamanca

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 2, No 4, 438 pages

Abstract: Abstract We provide a version of the Coase theorem within a general equilibrium framework. We consider an economy with other-regarding preferences, and where rights, licenses, or permissions are required to use, consume or transform some specific commodities. These permissions are initially allocated among consumers and, as the commodities, can be costlessly traded. In this scenario, we define different veto mechanisms and the corresponding core solutions that, naturally, result in the same set of efficient allocations. Our final result sets sufficient conditions on preferences and the requirement of rights to ensure that any equilibrium allocation belongs to the core and, in particular, is efficient.

Keywords: Cap-and-trade; Coase theorem; Competitive equilibrium; Core; Externalities; Other-regarding preferences; Rights; Tradable licenses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D51 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01330-9

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