Incentive compatibility under ambiguity

Huiyi Guo () and Nicholas C. Yannelis ()
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Huiyi Guo: Texas A&M University
Nicholas C. Yannelis: The University of Iowa

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 2, No 10, 565-593

Abstract: Abstract The paper examines notions of incentive compatibility in an environment with ambiguity-averse agents. In particular, we propose the notion of maxmin transfer coalitional incentive compatibility, which is immune to coalitional manipulations and thus more stable than the individual incentive compatibility condition. The main result characterizes the set of allocations that satisfy the maxmin transfer coalitional incentive compatibility condition. We show that an allocation satisfies maxmin transfer coalitional incentive compatibility if and only if it is maxmin interim efficient. This result extends that of De Castro and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 177:678–707, 2018) in the sense that ambiguity not only resolves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility, it also accommodates stability. Furthermore, this result is false in a finite economy where agents are subjective expected utility maximizers.

Keywords: Efficiency; Incentive compatibility; Transfer coalitional incentive compatibility; Maxmin preferences; D81; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01304-x

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