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Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation

Yan Chen () and YingHua He
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Yan Chen: University of Michigan

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 74, issue 1, No 10, 293-327

Abstract: Abstract When participating in school choice, students may incur information acquisition costs to learn about school quality. This paper investigates how two popular school choice mechanisms, the (Boston) Immediate Acceptance and the Deferred Acceptance, incentivize students’ information acquisition. Specifically, we show that only the Immediate Acceptance mechanism incentivizes students to learn their own cardinal and others’ preferences. We demonstrate that information acquisition costs affect the efficiency of each mechanism and the welfare ranking between the two. In the case where everyone has the same ordinal preferences, we evaluate the welfare effects of various information provision policies by education authorities.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Information provision; School choice; Deferred Acceptance mechanism; Boston Immediate Acceptance mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01376-3

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