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Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games

Pavlo Prokopovych

Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 61, issue 3, 541-552

Abstract: Abstract This paper is aimed at widening the scope of applications of majorized correspondences. A new class of majorized correspondences—domain $${\mathcal {U}}$$ U -majorized correspondences—is introduced. For them, a maximal element existence theorem is established. Then, sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in qualitative games are provided. They are used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact quasiconcave games that are either correspondence secure or correspondence transfer continuous.

Keywords: Majorized correspondence; Qualitative game; Better-reply secure game; Correspondence secure game; Transfer continuous game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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