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Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games

Pavlo Prokopovych

No 53, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics

Abstract: This paper is aimed at widening the scope of applications of majorized correspondences. A new class of majorized correspondences -- domain U-majorized correspondences -- is introduced. For them, a maximal element existence theorem is established. Then, sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in qualitative games are provided. They are used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact quasiconcave games that are either correspondence secure or correspondence transfer continuous.

Keywords: Majorized correspondence; Qualitative game; Better-reply secure game; Correspondence secure game; Transfer continuous game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
Date: 2014-11
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http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp53.pdf November 2014 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games (2016) Downloads
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