Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Fasil Alemante, Donald E. Campbell () and Jerry S. Kelly ()
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Fasil Alemante: The College of William and Mary
Donald E. Campbell: The College of William and Mary
Jerry S. Kelly: Syracuse University

Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 62, issue 4, No 5, 765-783

Abstract: Abstract The resolute domain of a social choice correspondence is the set of profiles at which only one alternative is selected. The Condorcet, plurality, approval voting, and maximin correspondences—restricted to their respective resolute domains—satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and a strong monotonicity condition, but are not characterized by those three conditions. We present examples illustrating this and provide additional conditions that do suffice for characterization.

Keywords: Social choice correspondence; Social choice function; Resolute domain; Anonymity; Neutrality; Monotonicity; Upper invariance; Lower invariance; Condorcet; Plurality voting; Approval voting; Maximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7

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