Effect of Good Corporate Governance Audit Quality Management and Earnings As A Moderating Variable

Wati Aris Astuti () and Sekar Mayangsari
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Wati Aris Astuti: Trisakti University, Indonesia
Sekar Mayangsari: Trisakti University, Indonesia

Finance, Accounting and Business Analysis, 2021, vol. 3, issue 1, 81-95

Abstract: The purpose of this study to determine the quality of audits in industry companies related to institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent board, the size of independent commissioner board and audit committee. And also, how earnings management moderate' institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent commissioner board, the size of the independent commissioner board and the audit committee on audit quality. The design or method in this study uses univariate and multivariate (regression) methods to determine the relationship between good corporate governance and audit quality and earnings management moderation. Population and samples from the Financial Statements of 105 industrial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, 2015-2019. The presented findings show that earnings management does not strengthen or weaken good corporate governance on audit quality.

Keywords: good corporate governance; audit quality and earning management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aan:journl:v:3:y:2021:i:1:p:81-95

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