Disliking to disagree: Implications of disagreement aversion for information disclosure

Kiryl Khalmetski (), Mark Le Quement () and Florian Hoffmann ()
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Kiryl Khalmetski: New Economic School
Mark Le Quement: School of Economics, University of East Anglia
Florian Hoffmann: Faculty of Economics and Business KU Leuven

No w0293, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: We formalize the notion of belief homophily under asymmetric information by introducing a preference for perceived disagreement aversion. We study its implications for information sharing in a disclosure model where a privately informed sender and an uninformed receiver have heterogeneous priors, while the sender is averse to the receiver’s perceived disagreement. Equilibrium disclosure is partial and tends to confirm the prior mean of the more confident player. The receiver earns more from senders whose prior means differ more from his own but whose prior variances are more similar. Perceived disagreement aversion implies qualitatively reverse predictions than aversion to actual disagreement.

Keywords: strategic disclosure; psychological games; disagreement aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 129 pages
Date: 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0293

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