Equivalence of Resource/Opportunity Egalitarianism and Welfare Egalitarianism in Quasilinear Domains

Duygu Yengin ()

No 2010-01, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We study the allocation of indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We show that the only allocation mechanism (upto Pareto-indifference) that satisfies the axioms supporting resource and opportunity egalitarianism is the one that equalizes the welfares. We present alternative characterizations, and budget properties of this mechanism and discuss how it would ensure fair compensation in government requisitions and condemnations.

Keywords: egalitarianism; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; allocation of indivisible goods and money; fair auctions; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness; population monotonicity; cost monotonicity; government requisitions; eminent domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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