Une théorie normative des contrats Etats-entreprises

Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1986, issue 1, 107-132

Abstract: We develop progressively models enabling us to characterize optimal contracts between government and firms when uncertainty and various types of asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) are present. We obtain normative contracts which are close to commonly used contracts with a linear sharing of overruns.

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075596 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1986:i:1:p:107-132

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().