The Fictitious Payoff Function: Two Applications to Dynamic Games

Margaret Slade ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1989, issue 15-16, 193-216

Abstract: The notion of a fictitious-payoff function is developed in the context of a dynamic model of oligopoly. It is shown that in a certain class of games, the oligopolistic market acts as if it were maximizing a single objective function--the fictitious-payoff function. The more complex problem of calculating multiplayer subgame-perfect equilibria is thus reduced to an ordinary optimization problem.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1989:i:15-16:p:193-216

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