La concurrence sociale va-t-elle remplacer la concurrence par les taux de change ?

Patrick Artus

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1997, issue 48, 83-100

Abstract: We analyze the cases in which it is possible that fixing exchange rates or entering a monetary union is an incentive for the countries, which lose the possibility of using the exchange rate as a policy instrument, to reduce in a non-coordinated way the cost of labor or the level of welfare.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076098 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:48:p:83-100

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().