Capital humain, mobilité du capital et commerce international

Eric Giraud-Heraud, Hakim Hammoudi and Alessandra Schiavina

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 52, 137-161

Abstract: We propose an analysis of international competion where a limited number of countries decide to cooperate on exchanges of an homogeneous good. We explain the reasons why such an agreement can be sustainable only if the cartel set up an importation tarif. However, the cartellisation, even with this trade restriction, improve the surplus of outside countries. We conclude the paper by an illustration with the Common Agricultural Policy within the European Union.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:52:p:137-161

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