Interconnexion de réseaux et charge d'accès: une analyse stratégique

Laurent Flochel

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1999, issue 53, 171-196

Abstract: We modelize a free price competition between a vertically integrated incumbent operating as an upstream monopolist in an essential facility and facing competition as service provider. The incumbent determines freely the access charge to its network. We determine conditions for which the incumbent forecloses the entrant by using access conditions to its facility. We then discuss values of access charge.

Date: 1999
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