Equilibres moétaires du jeu stratégique de marché dans le modèle à générations imbriquées

Francis De Morogues

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1999, issue 54, 1-21

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic model of general imperfect competition by embedding the Shapley-Shubik model of market games into an overlapping generations framework. We consider an economy with j >= 1 goods and N >= 2 agents. We show that the conditions for a non autarcic, symmetric and stationary equilibrium are equivalent to the conditions of a simple static optimization problem. We show that a non autarcic equilibrium exists if the market powers are not too high. This model gives a very clear framework to study relations between imperfect competition equilibrium and competitive equilibrium in a dynamic context. For example, in a one-good economy, we show that one can apply the tools of the studies of the non stationary competitive equilibrium to analyse the imperfect competition equilibrium.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:54:p:1-21

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