Salaire minimum et emploi en présence de négociations salariales

Guy Laroque and Bernard Salanié

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2004, issue 73, 1-22

Abstract: This paper studies the employment effects of the minimum wage when wages are negotiated at the individual level between firms and workers. Our data suggest that the Kalai-Samorodinsky solution fits the observations better than the Nash Solution. Results from estimating the model are rather disappointing, as they give no bargaining power to firms.

Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Salaire minimum et emploi en presence de négociations salariales (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:73:p:1-22

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