An application of 'post-welfarist' theories of justice: comparing theorical rights to compensation and actual policy measures against poverty

David Clément and Catherine Sofer ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2004, issue 75-76, 287-308

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore the empirical applicability of "post-welfarist" economic theories of justice and redistribution. We consider whether either of the two simple competing axioms of Bossert and Fleurbaey hold in the current French redistribution system. We first present the theoretical and methodological problems raised by the move from a purely individualistic theoretical approach to empirical measures integrating redistribution within households. We then propose a definition of justice and compensation which, as in Roemer [1996], uses effort variables defined in relative terms. The French benefit system can be considered as compatible with at least one of the axioms, but only under a very limited definition of individual responsibility: people are neither held responsible for their children, nor for their labour force or marital status.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: An application of 'post-welfarist' theories of justice: comparing theorical rights to compensation and actual policy measures against poverty (2004)
Working Paper: An application of 'post-welfarist' theories of justice: comparing theorical rights to compensation and actual policy measures against poverty (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:75-76:p:287-308

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