Health Prevention and Savings: How to Deal with Fatalism?

Johanna Etner and Meglena Jeleva ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2016, issue 121-122, 67-90

Abstract: In this paper, we first analyze the trade-off between primary prevention and savings when individuals face health (long-term care) risk. We suppose that there is no private insurance market for this risk and consider two risk management tools: primary prevention and savings. We emphasize the role of risk perception and, more precisely, we focus our discussion on the existence of a type of individuals that we call fatalists. Secondly, we analyze the role of risk perception on long-term care public policy. We propose to combine subsidies for prevention with a social insurance co-payment for long-term care expenditures. We show that the presence of fatalists is crucial in the optimal policy design.

Keywords: Health Risk; Primary Prevention; Long Term Care; Savings. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.121-122.67 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Health Prevention and Savings: How to deal with Fatalism? (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2016:i:121-122:p:67-90

DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.121-122.67

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().