Trust and Reciprocity between Spouses in India

Carolina Castilla

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 5, 621-24

Abstract: I present results from the first trust game conducted among married couples. The experiment consisted of a one-shot trust game where spouses were taken into separate rooms, not allowed to communicate, given a significant endowment, and both strategies and payoffs were common knowledge. Results indicate that only 3 percent of spouses in the sender role transfer the entire amount; the average proportion sent is 57 percent of the endowment. The limited sending is costly because the household on average is walking away with half of the potential earnings. The results provide further evidence of the lack of Pareto Efficiency within the household.

JEL-codes: C70 D13 J12 O12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151117
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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