Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

David Levine and Andrea Mattozzi

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 10, 3298-3314

Abstract: We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

JEL-codes: D72 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Working Paper: Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170476

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