The Economic Origins of Government

Robert Allen, Mattia C. Bertazzini and Leander Heldring

American Economic Review, 2023, vol. 113, issue 10, 2507-45

Abstract: We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision.

JEL-codes: D72 H11 H41 N45 N55 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201919

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