Crowding in School Choice
William Phan,
Ryan Tierney and
Yu Zhou
American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 114, issue 8, 2526-52
Abstract:
We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents' decision-making and the empirical literature; however, they cause difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive-compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature (the rural hospitals theorem, welfare lattice, etc.) survive.
JEL-codes: D47 H75 I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Crowding in School Choice (2021) 
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220626
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