Comparisons of Signals

Benjamin Brooks, Alexander Frankel and Emir Kamenica

American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 114, issue 9, 2981-3006

Abstract: A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell (1953), we characterize when one signal is more valuable than another regardless of preferences and regardless of access to other signals. This comparison is equivalent to reveal-or-refine: every realization of the more valuable signal reveals the state or refines the realization of the less valuable signal. We also study other comparisons of signals, including sufficiency, martingale dominance, and Lehmann. Reveal-or-refine is also equivalent to making any of these comparisons robust to access to other signals.

JEL-codes: C90 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230430

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