Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry

Dan Levin () and James Smith

American Economic Review, 1994, vol. 84, issue 3, 585-99

Abstract: The authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk-neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic. The presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare. The authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness (i.e., the relative abundance of buyers). Their analysis extends well-known revenue-equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies (e.g., reservation prices) in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.

Date: 1994
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