Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?

Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger

American Economic Review, 2006, vol. 96, issue 3, 877-895

Abstract: We provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that govern the use of subsidies to domestic production. Our analysis highlights the impact of the new subsidy disciplines that were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO. While GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed as weak and inadequate, our results suggest that the key changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels. (JEL: F02, F11, F13, F15, F53)

Date: 2006
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.877
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