The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?

Sultan Mehmood

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 4, 411-45

Abstract: A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive—via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments—promotes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential discretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters.

JEL-codes: D72 K40 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1257/app.20210176

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