Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

Abhijit Banerjee, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande and Michael Walton

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 16, issue 3, 323-53

Abstract: Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.

JEL-codes: D72 D83 H75 J16 O15 O17 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/app.20220088

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