Fiscal Backing for Price Stability in a Monetary Union

Bartosz Maćkowiak and Sebastian Schmidt

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2025, vol. 17, issue 3, 237-69

Abstract: Fiscal backing is the idea that for the price level to be uniquely determined, fiscal policy must be active at least in some states of the world. We extend the fiscal theory of the price level to a heterogenous monetary union. Different combinations of national fiscal policies and a common fiscal policy with "Eurobonds" amount to active fiscal policy for the union. They all yield price-level determinacy but can have very different implications for the effects of fiscal and monetary policy. We propose how to coordinate the national policies and the common policy to provide fiscal backing reliably.

JEL-codes: E31 E52 E62 F33 F45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:237-69

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DOI: 10.1257/mac.20220364

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