The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games

Riccardo Ghidoni and Sigrid Suetens

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, vol. 14, issue 4, 58-77

Abstract: Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequential play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooperation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or very high in both settings.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200268

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