Complementary Bidding and the Collusive Arrangement: Evidence from an Antitrust Investigation

Robert Clark, Decio Coviello and Adriano De Leverano

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, vol. 17, issue 2, 66-93

Abstract: Clustered bids and a missing mass of nearly tied bids have both been proposed as markers of collusion. We present causal empirical evidence from an actual procurement cartel that bidding involves both clustering and a gap around the winning bid. We support these results with information from the testimony of cartel participants that explains how both patterns arise naturally as part of an arrangement featuring complementary bidding. Based on these findings, we develop an easy-to-implement screen for collusive arrangements featuring complementary bidding.

JEL-codes: D43 D44 H76 L12 L13 L74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210450

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