Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains

Tobias Rachidi

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, vol. 17, issue 4, 181-201

Abstract: This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms. There are multiple alternatives, and the voters have generalized single-peaked preferences derived from median spaces as introduced in Nehring and Puppe (2007b). This class of preferences covers a wide range of economically relevant domains, and it is much larger than the well-known single-peaked preferences on a line. I characterize the welfare-maximizing voting rules among all social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and surjectivity. The optimal mechanisms are composed of binary votes on subsets of alternatives involving flexible majority requirements.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220133

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