Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms

Ryo Shirakawa

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, vol. 17, issue 4, 202-33

Abstract: Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choice, this paper proposes that mechanisms ought to be immune only to certain "simple" misreports. While no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, we find one under our weaker requirement: Kesten's (2010) efficiency adjusted DA (EADA). By extending our criterion to also prevent simple "collective" misreports, we obtain characterizations of Kesten's mechanism. These insights contribute to practical market design.

JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20230116 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/materials/24035 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/materials/24036 (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:17:y:2025:i:4:p:202-33

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230116

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().