Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Peter Coles, Alexey Kushnir () and Muriel Niederle ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 2, 99-134

Abstract: Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets. (JEL C78)

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.99
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Preference Signaling in Matching Markets (2010)
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